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C.B.P. Claassen 1II 
Abstract 
Using survey data from the third World Values Survey and democracy scores from 
Freedom House, I outline and test a supply and demand model of democratic change 
and stability. While "support for democracy" is a common concept in political science, 
the only empirical studies of the relationship between these regime preferences and 
democracy (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; Welzel, Inglehart and 
Klingemann 2003) do not control for reciprocal causation and use poorly 
conceptualised and measured variables. They claim that deeply-rooted cultural 
orientations called "self-expression values" are a better measure of implicit support 
for democracy than overt expressions of regime preference. However, I find that once 
I control for the possibility that democracy is exogenous, there is little difference 
between the explanatory power of cultural values versus overtly expressed 
preferences. Furthermore, I argue that popular regime preferences (or demand) affect 
the change in the level of democracy, but do so only in relation to its current supply. 
"Net demand" is the driver of system change rather than absolute levels of popular 
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Does it matter what citizens think about the type of political system they live in? Are 
the fortunes of a regime affected by the degree of support it receives from its citizens? 
Do positive evaluations of autocratic rule strengthen the hand of authoritarian elites? 
Does popular demand for democracy lead to democratisation? This study is an 
attempt to answer these questions, all of which address the relationship between the 
type of political regime and the attitudes of the public to that regime. I use empirical 
survey data on popular social values and regime preferences I from the third wave of 
the World Values Survey (WVS), and data on the extent of democratic rights and 
institutions collected by Freedom House (FH) to investigate "mass-regime" linkages 
across 44 countries over a constant five-year period beginning between 1995 and 
1998? I demonstrate that attitudes to democracy matter for change in the actual level 
of democracy - and that they matter over and above the impact of broader social 
values as a fonn of demand-side pressure on the authorities of a political systenr. 
Furthennore, when explaining democratic change or stability, I find that it is the 
relative level of "net" or "unmet" demand that is important, not the absolute level of 
public demand for democratisation. 
1.1 Research Problem 
It is an aXIOm of political science that a political regime requires some fonn of 
popular support to survive as it depends on rule by consent rather than by coercion. In 
recent years, with the global spread of cross-national survey data, the concept of 
regime legitimacy has become quantifiable and survey questions concerning overt 
I Support for democracy is called "regime preferences" and "explicit demand" in this study. Referring 
to these variables as supports is somewhat misleading because I argue that they should primarily be 
seen as mass demands. 
2 The year at which the five-year period begins for a given country is determined by the date when the 
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expressions of support for democracy are now common. However, most empirical 
studies use mass attitudes to the political regime as the dependent variable (cf. 
Klingemann 1999; Norris 1999; Mishler & Rose 2001; Bratton & Mattes 2001; Lagos 
2003). Thus, while these studies describe and explain support for democracy, they do 
not test whether support for democracy affects the institutions of the political system. 
The likely assumption is that mass-regime orientations have an effect on the structure 
of authority, either as a demand for reform or as a support for the existing regime. In 
other words, positive public evaluations of the regime, in the political science 
literature, are taken as a sign that the regime enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of its 
subjects (cf. Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Diamond 1999: chapter 5). 
Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel and Hans-Dieter Klingemann have 
undertaken the only empirical tests of these assumptions in three recent papers 
(lnglehart 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). 
They claim that a broad and deep-rooted syndrome of "self-expression values" (life 
satisfaction, trust, tolerance, political participation and post-materialism) is a better 
predictor of and explanation for democracy than overt expressions of support for 
democracy. However, methodological problems, particularly the untenable 
assumption of unidirectional causation,) influence their conclusion that overt support 
for democracy is spuriously related to the level of democracy. 
The rest of this chapter surveys the relevant literature on political culture and 
democracy, with particular focus on the work of Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart 
2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). In Chapter 
two, I adapt Easton's (1965) model of the political system to create a supply and 
demand model of democratic change, which predicts that popular demand matters, but 
does so only in relation to supply. Chapter three then operationalises this model, 
constructing variables of supply and demand from Freedom House democracy scores 
and survey data from the third World Values Survey. The fourth chapter begins by 
replicating Inglehart's studies, comparing the effects of self-expression values and 
regime preferences on the level of, and change in the level of, democracy. I then test 
3 Inglehart takes the correlation between values and democracy to mean that values cause democracy, 
without controlling adequately for the likely possibility that some of the covariance is a function of the 
effect of democracy on values. After all, democracy scores change slowly from year to year, so even if 
democracy is measured subsequent to the independent variable, it may still act as a proxy measure for 
an earlier level of democracy. In other words, the explanatory power of his models is inflated as he 
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the supply and demand model, analysing the effects of demand (relative to supply) on 
change in democracy. The final chapter concludes the study. 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2(a) Culture and Democracy 
The political culture paradigm of democratisation and consolidation explains political 
behaviour as a function of the politically relevant attitudes, values and beliefs of that 
society. 4 Political culture has its origin in the writings of Aristotle, Rousseau and 
T ocqueville who argued that democracies require some level of normative 
commitment from the public. However, the first systematic study of political culture 
analysis was done by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, who argued that a civic 
culture based on "communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and 
diversity" emerges with, and helps to ensure the survival of, democratic institutions 
(Almond & Verba 1963: 8). 
Yet while this paradigm focuses on the cultural correlates of democracy, it 
should be noted that any political regime benefits from some measure of popular 
support because, as Easton puts it, "if the authorities are to be able to make decisions, 
to get them accepted as binding, and to put them into effect without the extensive use 
of coercion, solidarity must be developed around the major aspects of the system 
within which the authorities operate" (Easton 1965: 158). In other words, political 
culture assumes that the regime the manner in which power is structured in a society, 
the particular arrangement of the apparatuses of government - is affected by the 
orientations of the public towards it. These "mass-regime" links have been most 
explicitly conceived in David Easton's (1965) cybernetic model. Much subsequent 
work on political culture, including this study, is located within the rubric of this 
model.s 
4 An alternative approach to democratisation and system change is the political.-economy paradigm. In 
this view, changes in the political system are explained as the product of strategic interactions between 
those actors who have power and an interest in the outcome (cf. O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986; 
Przeworski 1991; Wintrobe \998). 
5 See Chapter Two for a detailed outline of the theoretical model used in this paper, which borrows 
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After a lull in the previous decade, the analysis of political culture experienced 
a "renaissance" - to use Inglehart's (1988) description - in the 1990's, due to the 
greater availability of socio-political survey data from around the world, and the need 
to explain the collapse of the Soviet empire and the failure of authoritarian regimes in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. The first study ofthis generation was Inglehart (1988; 
extended in Inglehart 1990), which used data from the first World Values Survey to 
argue that - in the tradition of Almond and Verba - civic culture attitudes of trust and 
political participation could be used to explain the differing degrees of success of 
democracy and capitalism in various countries. 
In his later work, Inglehart (1997, 1999; Inglehart & Baker 2000) moved away 
from the concept of civic culture and developed a broader measure called "self-
expression values." Inglehart (1997) performed a principal component analysis of 
World Values Survey data, and argued that the key components were two orthogonal 
and significant dimensions of cross-cultural variation: "survival vs. self-expression 
values" and "traditional vs. rational-secular orientations to authority". He then went 
onto argue that these two dimensions had three important explanatory uses. First, 
when the values on one dimension are plotted against the other, the societies of the 
WVS arrange themselves into cultural and civilisational blocs (Inglehart 1999; 
Inglehart & Baker 2000). Second, examining the dispersion of GDP per capita on the 
same scatter-plot, a steady and clear increase in the level of economic development 
can be observed from the bottom left comer to the top right comer (ibid.). Thus, as the 
levels of both dimensions of values increase, the wealthier the society is likely to be. 
Third, (as discussed in the previous chapter) self-expression values exhibit strong 
positive correlations with the level of democracy in the respective countries (ibid.).6 
Inglehart and colleagues develop these observations into "the theory of human 
development", a type of modernisation theory (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Welzel, 
Inglehart & Klingemann 2003). Socio-economic development moderated by 
historical-cultural heritage - leads to generational value change as societies become 
more secular-rational, then more self-expressive (Inglehart 1997). In the words of 
Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, "traditional conformity values, which subordinate 
6 These findings are rendered more significant when one considers that the two dimensions of values 
are generated independently of the data on cultural blocs, economic development, or democracy, 
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human autonomy to community discipline tend to give way to more emancipative 
values that emphasise human choice" (2003: 342). Relying heavily on Abraham 
Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs, Inglehart argues that in contexts of 
material poverty, children will grow up valuing material security, but when one's 
basic needs are met, 'higher' post materialist or self-actualisation goals become 
important (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000). 
In the second step of the two-stage theory of human development, these self-
expression values create the demand for human rights and removal of legal 
restrictions on individual autonomy, which are associated with democratic values. 
Inglehart thus claims that self-expression values are the cultural precondition for 
democracy (Inglehart 1999; 2003; Inglehart & WelzeI2003). 
1.2(b) Empirical Studies of Regime Preferences and Democracy 
Building on his work that identified and explained self-expression values, Inglehart 
turned his attention to investigating the relationship between values and democracy. 
Inglehart (2003) seemed to demonstrate that self-expression values are a stronger 
predictor of stable democracy than explicitly expressed public regime preferences. He 
compares the correlations of self-expression values and a democracy/autocracy index 
- both calculated from the third or fourth waves of the World Values Survey (1995-
2001) - with two dependent variables, the 1995 Freedom House democracy score, and 
the cumulative Freedom House scores from 1981-2000. He finds that self-expression 
values correlate at .59 and .83 with the respective measures of democracy, compared 
with .35 and .51 for the regime preferences index (lnglehart 2003: Table 3). He 
concludes, 
[a]lthough lip service to democracy is almost universal today, it is not necessarily an 
accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in a given country. The extent 
to which a society emphasizes a syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism, and Post-
materialist values is a much stronger predictor of stable democracy. This syndrome has 
been labelled "Self-expression values ... " (Inglehart 2003: 51, emphasis in original). 
Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann (2003: figure 3) control for the number of years a 
country has spent under a democratic constitution, and show that self-expression 
values still have a significant effect on democracy. However, the authors also use a 
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democracy scores and Transparency International corruption perception ratings in an 
attempt to separate dejure from defacto democracies.7 
Finally, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) report that self-expression values explain 
74% of the variance of effective democracy, compared with only 34% explained by 
regime preferences. Moreover, the effect of self-expression values remains robust 
even after controlling for regime preferences and experience with democracy (ibid: 
Table 2).8 They conclude that "lip service to democracy is widespread, but it does not 
reflect a deep commitment to crucial democratic norms", while "the evidence 
indicates that a political culture that emphasizes tolerance, trust, life satisfaction, and 
participation plays a crucial role in effective democracy" (ibid.: 76). 
1.2(c) Critique of the Empirical Studies 
1.2(c)(i) Measurement of the Regime Preference Scale 
Inglehart and colleagues have a number of poorly conceptualised and measured 
variables in their papers. First, Inglehart (2003) uses a flawed regime preference scale. 
He adds together the percent that offer a positive evaluation of undemocratic rule in 
each of two questions,9 and adds the percent offering a positive view of democratic 
rule in each of two other questions. 10 The total undemocratic support is then 
subtracted from the total democratic support. He does not test the validity or 
reliability of this scale - particularly a problem because he uses the WVS question 
concerning technocratic rule, 11 which turns out to be weakly correlated with his other 
three items at the micro- and macro-levels. This suggests that Inglehart is not offering 
the most accurate measure of regime preferences, affecting the results of the bivariate 
7 See section 1.2( c )(iii), below, for an argument against this particular measurement of democracy. 
g "Experience with democracy" is equivalent to WelzeJ, Inglehart & Klingemann's (2003) "years of 
democracy" - the number of years, between 1850 and 1995, that a country has scored +7 or higher on 
the Polity 98 index. 
9 "For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing 
this country": "Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think is 
best for the country" and "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections". Percent answering "good" or "very good". 
10 "Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country": 
"Having a democratic political system", percent answering "good" or "very good". "Democracy may 
have problems but it is better than any other form of government", percent answering "agree" or 
strongly agree". 
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statistics he is reporting. The subsequent paper by Inglehart and Welzel (2003) 
remedies this: the authors uses Klingemann's (1999) demoeracy scale which measures 
consistent democratic preferences across four items from the World Values Survey, 
and excludes the technocratic rule question. 12 
1.2(c)(ii) Timing of the Variables 
Second, both versions of Inglehart' s dependent variable are measured prior to the 
independent variables, which undermines his conclusions. While Inglehart and Welzel 
(2003) use subsequent democracy scores, there is a time interval between independent 
and dependent variables that varies considerably across cases. Their measures of 
regime preferences date from between 1995 and 1998 while the dependent variable is 
the 1999 Freedom House scores. It is thus difficult to argue that the authors are 
accurately capturing the effect of regime preferences on democracy when, for some 
countries, there is a one year interval between these variables, while for others, four 
years passes. This is likely to weaken the relationship between these variables, 
especially in comparison with the relationship between self-expression values and 
democracy, for which there is a constant interval. 13 
1. 2 (c)(iii) Measurement of Democracy 
Inglehart, Welzel and Klingemann develop a measure of "effective democracy", 
which is the product of FH scores and the national scores from Transparency 
International's "Corruptions Perceptions Index" (CPI) (Welzel, lnglehart & 
Klingemann 2002; Inglehart & Welzel 2003). As such, they regard FH scores as only 
providing a measure of "formal democracy", while the CPI gives an indicator of "elite 
integrity". Their argument is that "[f]ormal rights are effective only in so far as elites 
respect these rights" and "elite integrity ... distinguishes effective democracy from 
formal democracy" (lnglehart & Welzel 2003: 66). Their measure also has the 
apparent benefit of providing a means of differentiating amongst new liberal 
12 Instead of the technocratic rule question (see footnote 11), they use: "would you say it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this count!)', having the army rule?" The others 
three questions are the same as reported in footnotes 9 and 10. 
13 Their scores for self-expression values are from the same survey and thus the same time - as 
regime preferences, but the authors calculate expected self-expression values for 1990 for every 
count!)'. This is performed with regressions using data for those countries that participated in the 
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democracies and older established democracies, both of which get similar high scores 
on the FH index but which may exhibit very real differences in individual 
empowerment. 
However, I believe their arguments are two deficient on three important points. 
First, while the concept of "effective democracy" is intuitively appealing it is flawed 
Contrary to their arguments, Freedom House scores are not just a measure of "formal 
rights." In fact, FH explicitly state that their scale "recognises that formal electoral 
procedures are not the only factors that determine the real distribution of power ... 
[t]he more that people suffer under such domination by unelected forces, the less 
chance a country has of receiving credit for self-determination" (Freedom House 
2002). Similarly with the civil liberties scale, "Freedom House does not mistake 
constitutional guarantees of human rights for those rights in practice" (ibid.). 
Several of FH's survey questions are clearly addressed at outcomes rather than 
just procedures. Three examples illustrate this point, with words or phrases 
emphasised to show items that overtly measure de facto democracy or elite integrity 
(the full checklist of questions is supplied in Appendix B): 
"Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?" 
"Is there significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility 
for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?" 
"Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is 
private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or 
organized crime?" (Freedom House 2002, emphasis added). 
Second, corruption perceptions scores do not address the problem that Inglehart and 
colleagues claim they do (i.e.: that Freedom House scores ""do not take into account 
the extent to which given rights are respected in actual elite behaviour" [Inglehart & 
Welzel 2003: 67]). The authorities can certainly threaten democracy; empirical 
procedural democratic theory is an attempt to isolate and measure the criteria that 
would hinder the ability of self-interested elites to concentrate power in their hands, 
and thus protect, strengthen and deepen democracy. Corrupt elites, however, are not a 
threat to democracy in the same way. Corruption is a serious political problem, and 
probably an impediment to democratic consolidation, but corrupt authorities do not 
affect the very structure of the regime; they do not change the mechanisms for the 
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interested in using their office for material gain rather than as a means for gaining 
more political power, and as such, elite corruption should be measured separately to 
democracy. 
Third, even if one accepts Inglehart's argument, the CPI measures mass 
perceptions of elite corruption, rather than attempting to give an "objective" measure 
of elite integrity. These public perceptions may be coloured by ideology, attitudes to 
democracy and social group, among other things. "Effective democracy" scores, like 
those from FH, are meant to be "objective" ratings - despite the obvious difficulties of 
this goal - that measure the actual extent of the concept in question in the political 
system. It is hard to justify the marriage of expert ratings of democracy and public 
ratings of corruption into a coherent concept. 
I.2(c)(iv) Direction a/Causation 
Inglehart (2003) errs in assuming unidirectional causation, that values produce 
democracy, without considering the possibility of reciprocal causation, that 
democracy could also lead to increases in levels of self-expression. 14 He simply 
correlates self-expression values and regime preferences with levels of democracy, 
but the explanatory power of these statistics is inflated through bidirectional causation. 
As mentioned, he also uses a dependent variable measured prior to the explanatory 
variables, exacerbating the problem. 
It is important to note, however, that using subsequent democracy scores (as 
Welzel, Ing]ehart & Klingemann [2003] and Inglehart & Welzel [2003] do) does not 
necessarily resolve this problem. Because levels of democracy across many countries 
remain much the same from one year to the next, democracy scores at time I form a 
good proxy measure for democracy scores at I-I. Thus, while a correlation between 
values at t and democracy at t+ 1 may appear to illustrate a unidirectional causal 
relationship, the effects of democracy at t-J on values at I may still be felt as the 
democracy scores at the two time periods are likely to be virtually identical. Thus, the 
only way to confidently show unidirectional causation is to control for prior levels of 
democracy. 
14 See Muller & Seligson (1994) and Jackman & Miller (1996) for a similar argument about reciprocal 
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Furthermore, not only is it likely that the level of democracy at a particular 
time affects subsequent measures of both self-expression values and regime 
preferences, but it may do so to different degrees. Values are viscous, deeply rooted 
cultural orientations. An individual's level of self-expression remains relatively fixed 
over her lifetime, while macro levels of self-expression change only through 
generational shifts caused by increases in material wealth (Inglehart 1997: 34; 
Inglehart & Baker 2000). Regime preferences are more capricious, and can fluctuate 
sharply at the individual and social levels, as they involve individual cognition and 
evaluation of the political world, as well as early socialisation (cf. Rose & Mishler 
2001: 309-315; Bratton & Mattes 2001; Mattes & Bratton 2003; Inglehart 2003: Table 
4). Since regime preferences are "periodically updated and adjusted throughout life as 
initial beliefs are tempered, reinforced or challenged by later life experiences" (Rose 
& Mishler 2001: 309), factors that affect the social structure such as economic 
development and democratisation should influence preferences less than values 
(which are products of socialisation). In this way, the inflation of the relationship 
between values and democracy caused by reciprocal causation in Inglehart (2003) and 
Welzel and Inglehart (2003) is likely to greater than that between preferences and 
democracy. 
Nevertheless, Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) and Inglehart and 
Welzel (2003) attempt to show unidirectional causal processes by controlling for the 
influence of previous levels of democracy on self-expression-values. Both papers 
attempt to control for prior levels of democracy by using a control variable called 
"democratic experience" or "democratic tradition". This variable is defined as the 
number of years between 1850 and 1995 that a country has scored higher than +7 on 
the Polity 98 democracy index. I5 Presumably the authors want to use this variable to 
control for any possibility that experience in a democratic system has socialised 
individuals into a pro-democratic political culture, but its 145-year time-span seems 
too long - extending far beyond the lifetimes of all respondents in the WVS. 
Furthermore, this variable is a very crude measure of democracy. The authors 
effectively use a dummy variable, where all Polity 98 scores between +7 and +10 are 
coded as '1', and scores between -10 and +6 are collapsed together to be coded as '0', 
removing the information about degrees of democracy present in the original dataset. 
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In addition, the Polity 98 index is not as comprehensive a measure as the Freedom 
House dataset - it uses post-hoc scoring of democratic institutions and only considers 
formal democracy, not civil rights. 16 
In addition, neither of the two papers uses this variable in a model that 
includes self-expression values, regime preferences and experience with democracy, 
thus weakening Inglehart's (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel's (2003) conclusion that 
regime preferences do not matter. Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann (2003), for their 
part, do not tackle the issue of whether regime preferences or self-expression values 
offer a better measure of demand for democracy. Their path model only attempts to 
unpack the relationships amongst level of economic development, self-expression 
values and effective democracy. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2003) draw their conclusions only from their seventh 
model, which regresses values and preferences, and their first and fourth models, each 
of which includes only a single regressor, values and preferences, respectively_ As 
such, there is still no effective control for the issue of reciprocal causality between 
values and democracy in their paper. 
1.3 Overview and Research Question 
Regime legitimacy is an important concept in political SCIence, and one variant, 
support for democracy (or regime preferences) is widely measured in large socio-
political surveys such as the World Values Survey and the Global Barometers. 
However, this data is used on "faith" - as Inglehart (2003: 51) puts it. There has been 
no empirical investigation as to the effects of support for democracy on the political 
system, except for the recent work of Inglehart and colleagues, who maintain that "lip 
service" to democracy is spurious, and self-expression values represent mass demand 
for democracy_ 
However, I argue that Inglehart and colleagues' conclusion is supported by 
methodological flaws. In their papers, they assume unidirectional causation without 
controlling for it, and use a poorly conceptualised control; they also use an invalid 
measure of democracy; and there is an irregular interval between regime preferences 
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and democracy in their work. These flaws mean that the issue of whether support for 
democracy matters has still not been resolved, leading to my research question: 













2.1 A Political System of Supply and Demand 
13 
I follow Easton in assuming that it is useful to think about a political system, being "a 
set of interactions through which valued things are authoritatively allocated for a 
society" (Easton 1965: 153). In this section, I adapt Easton's basic framework, but 
also introduce the microeconomic concepts of supply and demand. 17 The utility of a 
systems approach to politics is that it allows one to understand the behaviour of 
political elites as bound together with the public'S attitudes, beliefs and expectations 
to the authorities. In this light, the elements of this particular model are the public and 
the authorities, elites, or decision-makers. 18 The actions of the authorities affect and 
are affected by - public sentiments in a process of negative feedback (cf. ibid.: 28). 
The decision-making apparatus can take different forms, or regimes (for 
example: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, one-party system, or military junta). 
A regime is the manner in which power is structured and distributed in a society. 
Furthermore, I assume that while political regimes can be arranged in various 
categories, they can also be ranked along a single dimension of the degree of 
democracy, or degree of popular control. 19 The characteristics of democratic 
governments, such as fair elections and opportunities to contest power,20 may be 
present in greater or lesser degrees in different regimes - other differences between 
them notwithstanding. 
J7 The classic use of supply and demand in a political context is Anthony Downs' Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957). Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer (1998) discuss democratisation within a supply and 
demand framework, although only at a conceptual level. Mattes & Bratton (2003) use a quantitative 
measure of supply and demand for democracy in Africa, although they use a measure of perceived 
supply that differs from mine. 
18 Easton (1965) identifies the "core" and the "environment" as his main elements. The core is 
analogous to my use of authorities, while his environment was broader than my conceptualisation of 
the public, including international society too. My model differs from Easton's in another respect: he 
considers the "environment" to be outside the system. His political system consists of the "core" and 
the mechanisms for converting demands into outputs (see Easton 1965: 30). 
19 This assumption is the subject of some debate, see Elkins (2000) and section 3.1 (a) for more detail. 
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The public demands and the authorities supply? I "Demand", as used here, 
does not mean vigorous lobbying by politically organised citizens, but is a fairly 
passive concept, referring either to support for the existing supply of political goods 
or a preference for more of a particular good.22 Elites supply a variety of political 
goods (such as taxation, law and order, education, money supply) - those with power 
tacitly or directly permit the bureaucratic machinery to execute a particular set of 
policies. 
The public evaluate the supply of a political good and respond with a level of 
demand, (in this context it is more familiar to refer to their preferences as "supports") 
which, in tum, affects the subsequent level of supply. In other words, there is a 
negative feedback loop between supply and demand. The effect of the feedback loop 
is to bring the system to equilibrium - to the point where demand is balanced by 
supply. If the level of demand is greater than the level of supply, there is excess 
demand, and thus pressure on the authorities to deliver more supply. Similarly, if 
demand is less than supply, the existence of surplus supply will result in the 
authorities allocating resources elsewhere. 
Finally, the public may demand some types of political goods that affect the 
nature of the regime, for example: increased political rights, reduced elite power, or 
greater regional autonomy. These "mass-regime" demands - which are the focus of 
this paper - require the authorities to supply changes in the very structure of the 
regime. If we conceive of democracy as consisting of a cluster of characteristics 
centred around popular control of power23 (each of which may be present in the 
system to a greater or lesser extent) then the public. can demand democracy if they 
demand more of these democratic characteristics, or if they demand that the existing 
ones be deepened or strengthened. 
There are costs involved in the supply of any political good that are likely to 
disturb the rather sparse conceptualisation of supply and demand introduced here. The 
public's demand for law and order, for example, is likely to be far higher than the 
level which is able to be supplied. Supply is thus a function of the costs of supply, as 
21 Easton's model holds that the authorities produce "outputs", and the environment produces "inputs" 
(1965: 25). His use ofthese two terms reflects his placing public opinion outside the system unlike 
this model where it is a component of the system. 
22 For this reason J don't follow Easton in separating inputs into "demands" and "supports" (see Easton 
1965: 27). "Demand" does the work of Easton's two concepts by itself. 
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well as demand. In the case of demand for democracy, there are a different set of costs 
which are likely to be even more pernicious than the fiscal variety_ If the authorities in 
an undemocratic system supply democratic goods, they will threaten their own 
positions of power through their actions. As such, we can assume that the supply of 
democracy is likely to lag behind the level of demand as elites have an inherent 
proclivity to consolidate power in their hands. 
The consequences of this model for changes in the level of democracy are as follows: 
1. The authoritarian trap (stable). When demand is low and supply is low (i.e.: when 
the system is undemocratic and the public doesn't prefer democracy) the system 
will stabilise at an undemocratic leve1.24 Elites will deliver no more democracy 
than is demanded of them, and most likely, less. 
2. Popular democratisation (unstable). Democratisation is the process whereby a 
political system moves from a regime of low democracy to a regime of greater 
democracy. High demand and low supply means that the system is out of balance. 
Despite the efforts of the authorities to retain power and suppress dissent, in the 
long run, elites will respond with democratic reform and political liberalisation, 
although perhaps only once there has been a change in incumbents. 
3. Mass apathy (unstable). A democracy with little support - high supply and low 
demand - is unstable, again because the system is out of balance. The preference 
of elites for the concentration of power in their hands threatens the democratic 
rights and institutions in these countries. Over the long run, these states experience 
what Diamond (1999) calls the "hollowing out" of democracy. 
4. Stabilisation of democracy (stable). Democracy becomes stable once demand for 
the regime consistently matches the level of supply at a relatively high level, and 
protects the regime from authoritarian drift. It is important to note that regime 
stabilisation is not the same as regime consolidation; the former is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the latter?5 
24 The concept of stability is used in this model to refer to a political system that consistently supplies a 
particular quantity of democracy over a length of time. 
25 This study examines the effects of regime preferences on democratisation and regime stabilisation. In 
order to avoid tautological reasoning, it is not a study of consolidation, as this concept is defrned partly 
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16 
Furthennore, there are several consequences for empirical research that follow from 
this analysis. First, the theoretical model suggests that the effects of demand on 
change in democracy, rather than level of democracy, should be investigated. Second, 
the model highlights that demand matters only in relation to supply. It is the amount 
of unmet demand in a given political system that is of consequence, not the absolute 
level of demand. A high level of demand for democracy (ignoring for the moment 
how that is to be measured) will have different consequences depending on the supply 
of democratic rights available to the public. In a democratic system, high demand is 
likely to exert a stabilising influence; in an undemocratic system, high demand for 
democracy will put the authorities under pressure to implement democratic refonn. 
The empirical analysis of this paper unlike the published work by Inglehart and 
colleagues will take heed of these consequences. 
2.2 Conceptualisation of the Model 
2.2(a) Supply 
The model of supply and demand used the tenn "supply" as the output of political 
goods by the decision-making apparatus. Focussing on the area of change in the level 
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extent that the characteristics of democracy, are present in a particular political system 
at a point in time. 
This conceptualisation of supply as a set of measurable democratic criteria 
matches Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy". Polyarchy is based on two dimensions 
political competition and participation with a third dimension, individual rights, to 
guarantee the first two (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999). Dahl built upon Joseph 
Schumpeter's (1942) narrow definition of democracy as the free competition for votes 
in a political marketplace with the realisation that the presence of free elections is not 
enough to prevent powerful interests from skewing the system to their advantage. 
Dahl thus stipulated seven specific and given his positive approach, measurable -
characteristics, which he felt provided a realistic, yet meaningful definition of 
democracy: 
1. the election of government officials 
2. free and fair elections 
3. universal suffrage 
4. unrestrained opportunity to run for public office 
5. freedom of political expression 
6. unrestrained access to alternative information 
7. unrestrained opportunity to form independent political organizations 
(Dahl 1989: 1 Off). 
Since the third wave of democracy has swept by, and receded in a few countries, some 
authors have argued that democracy also requires a strong state (cf. Rose & Ylishler 
2003; Rose & Doh 2001). In this vein, Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer (1998) and Diamond 
(1999) contend that the rule of law is a necessary component of democracy, for 
otherwise venal or corrupt governors can undermine the de jure rights and 
opportunities of procedural democracy. In addition, Diamond (1999: 11-12) adds the 
criteria of horizontal accountability between the branches of government and minority 
rights to the realist definition of democracy. 
I follow this procedural or realist approach to democracy. It matches the 
specifications of the model, which deals with degrees of popular control, and it is 
measurable and quantifiable, which suits my purposes in testing the effects of regime 
preferences.26 
26 This empirical democratic approach has been criticized as "formal" or "elite" democracy for its 
minimal conception of rights and institutions that ignores the distribution of power in a society, and 
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2.2(b) Demand 
2.2(b)(i) Explicit Demand 
In the model, I described demand as a passive approval of the current supply of 
democracy, or a predilection for more (or less) democratic rights. As such, demand 
fits the notion of a "preference" rather well. The public of a country demands more 
democracy when, ceteris paribus, they would prefer to have an amount, x+ 1, of 
democracy, rather than x (which is not to say that they will campaign, lobby, or 
demonstrate for this degree of democracy; although they may well do so). Explicitly 
expressed demand is a preference, and it is a preference about an aspect of the 
political regime (hence: regime preference). 
The concept of a regime preference has an analogue in Easton's systems 
model. He argues that the public can "support" three aspects of the political system 
independently of each other: the regime, the political community (or nation), and the 
authorities (or incumbent office-holders) (Easton 1965: 286-289). In Pippa Norris' 
more detailed typology of five objects of support, regime preference matches the 
second, "support for the regime principles" (Norris 1999: 10-12). 27 Regime 
preferences will be referred to as explicit demand. 
2.2(b)(ii) Implicit Demand 
Thinking of regime preferences as an explicit, overt form of demand for democracy is 
straightforward. Inglehart argues though, that self-expression values offer an implicit, 
indirect, but more deeply rooted and meaningful measure of a society's "intrinsic 
support" for democracy (Ingle hart & Welzel 2003: 74).28 In this study, self-expression 
values are used as a rival measure of demand for democracy. They will be called 
implicit demand and their explanatory power will be compared with regime 
preferences, or explicit demand. 
1977). Furthermore, the empirical democratic school has been criticised for its tendency to cast itself as 
value-free (cf. Strauss 1962). 
27 A maximum likelihood factor analysis of 11 questions from the WVS validates Norris' second, third 
and fourth objects of support - support for regime principles, regime performance, and regime 
institutions but splits support for regime principles into two factors, one involving evaluations of 
authoritarian rule, the other, democracy. 
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2.3 Overview 
In this chapter, I have outlined a model of the political system that seeks to explain 
change in the level of democracy as a function of public demand for democracy 
(meaning: the public preference for democracy over alternative regimes). I suggested, 
that in the tradition of Easton (1965), demand and supply (or the extent to which 
democratic characteristics are present in the system) interact through a negative 
feedback loop so that, over the long run, if supply and demand are out of equilibrium, 
supply will be increased or decreased to match the level of demand. In the short run 
however, other factors intervene: most notably, the inherent aversion undemocratic 
elites have for democratic reform as it affects their positions of power. 
The next chapter will build on the conceptualisation of the model introduced 
here. With an eye to the critique of Inglehart and colleagues' work discussed in the 
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Chapter 3 
Operationalising the Model 
20 
This chapter will describe operational measures for the variables of the model that 
build upon the conceptual foundations laid in the last chapter, and seek to remedy the 
methodological flaws of Inglehart and colleagues' papers that were discussed in the 
first chapter. The first section considers how the dependent variable, supply of 
democracy, can be measured and calculated. In particular, although I also use 
Freedom House democracy data, there are three major breaks with [nglehart's 
measurement As per the supply and demand model, I focus on change in democracy; 
I also use a fixed interval of five years between the measurement of the independent 
variables and the last democracy score; finally, I dispense with Inglehart and Welzel's 
concept of "effective democracy" and argue why it makes good sense to use 
unadulterated FH data. 
The second section moves on to describe the operationalisation of the 
independent variables measuring demand for democracy. As outlined earlier, there are 
two variants of demand: implicit and explicit, or regime preferences and self-
expression values; data for both is taken from the third World Values Survey. I test 
the reliability and validity of various aggregation methods for constructing my explicit 
demand scale, and then outline how I calculated national implicit demand scores. 
Finally, I explain the use of the "net demand" variants of implicit and explicit demand, 
arguing that they should represent better explanations of democratic change than 
absolute levels of demand. 
The third section discusses the sample of countries for which data is available, 
and outlines the statistical tests which \\'i11 be used to analyse the data in the next 
chapter. I also introduce the hypotheses that will be tested. 
Before I begin discussing the methodology of this study, it may be instructive 
to recap the problems with the Inglehart studies. First, Inglehart and Welzel (2003) 
and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) use an invalid and poorly 
conceptualised dependent variable, which they call "effective democracy". Second, 
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expression values on democracy, while they use a much shorter and inconsistent 
interval of between one and four years to show the effect of regime preferences on 
democracy. 
Finally, Inglehart (2003) does not control for reciprocal causation, which 
probably inflates his estimates of the effects of self-expression values on democracy-
especially in comparison to the effects of regime preferences, because preferences are 
unlikely to be influenced by prior levels of democracy to the extent that values could 
be. Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) 
attempt to resolve this problem by controlling for "democratic experience", which, I 
argue, is an inadequate control for previous democracy. Moreover, neither of the 
papers uses this control variable in a full-enough range of models for the reader to 
gauge whether regime preferences are indeed just "lip service" to democracy, as 
Inglehart claims. 
3.1 Dependent Variable: Supply 
I use a conceptualisation of democracy as a measure of the degree to which the 
institutions and rights that guarantee as best as possible - popular control of power, 
are present in a political system. I have discussed how this view of democracy builds 
upon the work of Robert Dahl, including the additional democratic criteria offered by 
scholars such as Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) and Diamond (1999). 
Some scholars regard continuous measures of democracy as problematic, and 
prefer dichotomous classifications (Huntington 1991; Alvarez et at 1996; Przeworski 
& Limongi 1997). They criticise gradations of democracy on grounds of validity (that 
democracy is a kind of regime, not a quantifiable characteristic of regimes) and 
reliability (that dichotomous measures contain less error) (Alvarez et at 1996). 
However, Elkins (2000) tested these complaints and found that continuous measures 
have better construct validity and greater reliability. He concluded, "looking for 
traces of democracy in seemingly 'nondemocratic' regimes makes good theoretical 
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For my purposes, Freedom House (FH) provides the best relevant measure of 
democracy, as their index matches my conceptualisation of democracy by explicitly 
engaging with Dahl's work, and by enabling me to discuss "degrees" of democracy. 
Freedom House offers expert ratings of the extent of democracy in two scales, 
"political rights" and "civil liberties" , for nearly 200 countries and territories for every 
year since 1972 (Freedom House 2004). The political rights index of the Freedom 
House scale measures the degree to which 
• the authorities are elected, 
• campaigning and elections are fair, 
• there is freedom of political organisation, 
• there is opposition power, 
• there is freedom from domination by powerful interests, 
• there is reasonable self-determination for minorities. 
The civil liberties index evaluates the extent to which 
• there is freedom of belief and expression, 
• there are associational and organisational rights, 
• the rule of law prevails and human rights are respected, 
• personal autonomy and economic rights are respected (Freedom House 2002).29 
When combined, the FH democracy score measures procedural democracy - as 
described in the previous chapter - including the core criteria of polyarchy, as well as 
the refinements suggested by later authors. Each index is scored from 1-7, with 1 the 
most democratic category. In this study, the scores are reversed, so that higher values 
represent "more" democracy, and a mean of the two indices is calculated. 
My operationalisation of the level of democracy improves on shortfalls in 
Inglehart's work in three ways. First of all, I use the democracy index from Freedom 
House, not Inglehart and Welzel's invalid measure of "effective democracy". Second, 
I use a fixed interval between the measurement of demand, and the measurement of 
supply of democracy. Finally, my main research question asks about the impact of 
public demand on the extent and direction of democratic change, which can be 
broadly categorised into: 1) regime democratisation, 2) regime "autocratisation", or 3) 
regime stabilisation. Thus, in contrast to the Inglehart studies, which only use the 
29 See Appendix B for the full checklist of criteria that Freedom House use to evaluate the strength of 
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level of democracy at t as a dependent variable, I use the change in the supply of 
democracy as well as testing the effects of demand on level of democracy. 
My model identifies change in democracy as the effect of various levels of 
demand; but it has the additional benefit of resolving the reciprocal causality problem. 
If there is bidirectional causation between democracy and values or preferences, then 
testing the effects of the latter on change in democracy ensures that any correlations 
or regression coefficients are only reporting unidirectional effects. 
Change in democracy is measured by calculating the change in FH scores. An 
initial mean score is extracted from the two yearly FH scores that straddle the year, 't', 
when the WVS was conducted in that country. Then a second mean score is extracted 
from the two FH scores that occur 5 years later, '1+5'. These two scores also provide 
the data for the two "level of democracy" scores: democracy at I, and democracy at 
t+ 5. The democracy at t+ 5 score is subtracted from the democracy at t score to get a 
measure of the change in democracy between t and t+5. For example, the WVS was 
conducted in Argentina in 1996 so a mean for the 1995/6 and 199617 FH scores is 
calculated, followed by a mean for the 200011 and 2001/2 scores, and the first mean is 
subtracted from the second to arrive at Argentina's change in democracy score.30 
Inglehart and Welzel (2003) use an interval between independent and 
dependent variables that varies considerably, between cases, and between preferences 
and values. However, I calculate my dependent variables whether level of, or 
change in, democracy so as to maintain a constant five-year interval with the 
independent variables in order to measure the effects of demand more accurately. 
3.2 Independent Variable: Demand 
3.2(a) Explicit Demand 
This study requires nationally representative data on regime preferences and self-
expression values which allow for cross-national comparisons and which cover 
enough countries to permit multivariate analysis. The data must also not be too recent, 
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or else the effects of explicit demand on change in levels of democracy cannot be 
examined. 
The third wave of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted between 1995 
and 1998 fulfils these criteria. In public surveys, questions tapping regime preferences 
generally ask respondents to support or oppose democracy and various undemocratic 
regimes. There are five relevant questions from the WVS: 
I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about 
each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? 
V 154. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections 
V155. Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is 
best for the country 
V 156. Having the army rule 
V157. Having a democratic political system. 
I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political 
system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree 
strongly, after I read each one of them? 
V 163. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. 
On the face of it, these five questions seem to measure the extent of individual 
preference for democracy, but since an explicit demand scale will be constructed, they 
need to be tested for construct validity with factor analysis. The question concerning 
technocratic rule, V155, was removed because it had a very weak communalities 
loading and also reduces the reliability of the index (Cronbach's alpha = 0.57). The 
factor matrix for the four remaining factors confirms the micro-level construct validity 
of regime principles as an object of mass demands. 31 Furthermore, the scale is 
reliable at the macro level.32 
31 Although - as mentioned previously - when a factor analysis is conducted on a broader set of 
questions pertaining to the objects of support, the two "democracy" questions are separated from the 
two "authoritarian rule" questions in the analysis. 
32 Obviously, once the data is aggregated to the macro-level, the validity and reliability statistics are 
much higher. With an average percent preference aggregation methodology (see next sub-section), the 
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Table 3.1: Validity and Reliability of Explicit Demand 
Question 
Democracy is better than alternatives (163) 
Rate: democratic system (157) 
Rate: army rule (156) 
Rate: strong leader (l54) 
Variance explained by Jactor 
Cronbach's alpha 
Source: Calculated from WVS (1998) 
Notes: Individual level data 
N 68733 
maximum likelihood; extracted a single unrotated dimension 








The factor analysis shows that it makes sense to create a regime preference scale, but 
the WVS provides individual level data, while this study makes a national level 
argument: the attitudinal data needs to be aggregated. This involves two steps. The 
first step requires calculating national scores for each item, and entails a choice 
between three methods of aggregation: national means; percent strong agreement 
(those respondents who strongly agree with the question); and percent general 
agreement (where strong or mild agreement is counted together). 
The second step requires a further choice between three alternative methods. 
We can continue using mean scores, and simply find the average national score from 
the four national-level items mean scores. Alternatively, we can count the percent 
who prefer democracy (either generally or strongly) in two different ways: by 
counting only those who prefer democracy on every one of the four items (percent 
consistent preference); or the average percent preference for democracy across all 
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Table 3.2: Recoding the Data 
Original 
Recoded to 





"rate strong Very good -2 0 0 
leader" (154) & Fairly good 2 -1 0 0 
"rate army rule" Fairly bad 3 I 0 
(156) Very bad 4 2 1 
Don't know 9 0 0 0 
"rate Very good 2 1 1 
democratic Fairly good 2 I 0 I 
system" (157) Fairly bad 3 -1 0 0 
Very bad 4 -2 0 0 
Don't know 9 0 0 0 
"democracy is Strongly agree I 2 1 
better than Agree 2 1 0 
alternatives" Disagree 3 -1 0 0 
( 163) Strongly disagree 4 -2 0 0 
Don't know 9 0 0 0 
Source: WVS (1998) 
In the literature, regime preferences have usually been calculated with consistent 
general agreement or average general agreement (cf. Diamond 1999; Klingemann 
1999; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart & Welzel 2003; Lagos 2003; Mattes & Bratton 2003). 
The benefit of these methods is that they measure the size of particular constituencies, 
such as the percent of the public who prefer democracy to authoritarian alternatives. 
In addition, they offer an easily interpretable figure: the fraction of a national 
population who offer a positive evaluation of democracy. 
A national mean, on the other hand, offers a measure of the democratic 
Zeitgeist of the public at one time, combining pro- and anti-democratic sentiments 
with information about the intensity of these preferences, as well as if the "don't 
know's" are included as a middle category counting the opinions of the undecided 
or impassive. While a consistent agreement scale collapses all response categories 
into two - those who prefer democracy or not - the national mean score measures five 
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responses inbetween. As such, this aggregation method contains the greatest amount 
of information. 
I tested the five different aggregation methods (mean scores, percent general 
consistent preference for democracy, percent strong consistent preference, percent 
general average preference and percent strong average preference) against each other. 
The first test (Table 3.3) examines the national scores for each of the four explicit 
demand items, calculated according to the three methods of means, percent prefer, and 
percent strongly prefer. Table 3.2 shows how the three methods recode the micro-
level data. (Note that for the mean scale, the items are all recoded so that higher 
scores represent preferences for democracy; this entails reversing the "polarity" of the 
democracy items, 157 and 163.) This macro-level data is then examined with factor 
analysis and reliability analysis (table 3.3); the former will determine which method 
yields a scale with the best construct validity; the latter will check reliability. 
Table 3.3 shows that national scores that measure the percent who generally 
prefer democracy results in a scale that shows the best validity and reliability. 
Nevertheless, there is not much to differentiate the three, suggesting that the concept 
of regime preference is tapping a robust kind of public attitude. 
However, such a scale can be aggregated according to either average or 
consistent agreement across the four items, a choice which is tested by examining the 
correlations of these two types of scales with the FH democracy scores at t+ 5 (table 
3.4). Since we expect regime preferences to be associated with levels of democracy in 
the real world, this tests the criterion validity of these two aggregation methods.33 It is 
thus assumed that the stronger the relationship between a particular scale and the 
democracy scores, the better it measures the concept of regime preferences. Within 
each method, correlations are shown between the level of democracy at t+ 5 and an 
index of all four items, as well as for the democratic (VI57 & v163) and authoritarian 
rule (V154 & V156) sub-indices (Table 3.4). 
33 Democracy at t+ 5 is not my dependent variable (although I use it to build from lnglehart's results), 
otherwise I would be guilty of choosing the operationalisation of the independent variable that best 
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Table 3.3: Testing Three Methods of Aggregating the Micro-level Data 
Aggregation method 
% who prefer democracy 
% who strongly prefer democracy 
Mean preference for democracy 
Validity 





Source: Calculated from WVS (1998) and FH (2004). 
Notes: National-level data for WVS items 154, 156, 157 & 163 
N=44 
Maximum likelihood extraction 
Reliability 




Table 3.4: Testing Two Methods of Combining the Aggregated Items 
Correlation with FH democracy scores at t+5 ... 
Average percent prefer democracy 
Democracy sub-index 
Authoritarian rule sub-index 
Total index 
Percent consistently prefer democracy 
Democracy sub-index 
Authoritarian rule sub-index 
Total index 
Source: Calculated from WVS (1998), and FH (2004) 













While both the different methods perform similarly well, combining the items by 
finding the average preference for democracy yields better criterion validity than 
using consistent agreement. Furthermore, table 3.3 shows that using percent general 
preference is the best method for aggregating individual-level data into national level 
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best taps the concept of regime preferences, and the method which is used in this 
study. 
3.2(b) Implicit Demand 
My measure of implicit demand, self-expression values, is calculated according to the 
method employed by Inglehart (1997). He performed a factor analysis on 22 items 
from the first and second WVS to extract the two principal components referred to as 
"secular-rational orientations to authority" and "self-expression values". Inglehart and 
Baker then report that using 10 selected variables generates very similar results (2000: 
25). I replicate their methodology, obtaining nationally aggregated standardised scores 
for each of the 10 items across the 44 countries in this study, and running a principal 
component factor analysis at the national level with varimax rotation; there are only 
two components extracted.34 The secular-rational component explains 47 percent of 
cross-national variation, while the self-expression component explains 27 percent.35 
The single anomaly in my construction of these value dimensions is that the "trust" 
item loads more weakly on the self-expression component than on the secular-rational 
component, in contrast to what Inglehart & Baker report. Like Inglehart, I report self-
expression values as z-scores as they are the output of a factor analysis.36 
34 I use a different kind of factor analysis in building my explicit demand index principal component 
extraction is Inglehart's methodology. 
35 Inglehart & Baker report that the components account for 44% and 26% of variance respectively 
(2000: Table 1). 
36 Converting data to z-scores is an attempt to standardise them. Z-scores are built on the assumption 
that the sample is normally distributed around a mean of 0, and with a standard deviation of 1, so that 
68% of the sample has scores of between -I and + 1 and 95% of the sample has scores between -2 and 
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Table 3.5: Two Dimensions of Values 
Secular-Rational values emphasise ... a 
God is not important 
It is more important for a child to learn 
independence than obedience and faith 
Abortion is justifiable 
Low national pride 
A negative view of respect for authority 
Self-Expression Values emphasise ... 
Self-expression and quality of life rather 
than economic and physical security 
Subjective happiness 
Participation by signing petitions 
Homosexuality is justifiable 
People can be trusted 
Variance explained by component 
Source: Original data from WVS (1998). 
Rotated loadings 













Notes: a according to Inglehart & Baker (2000: Table 1) 
N = 44 national scores 
Principal Component Extraction with Varimax rotation 
















I argued earlier, in Chapter two, that it is not the absolute level of demand in a system 
that is important, but demand relative to the level of supply that is the motive force of 
democratisation. The fate of a political system - whether it remains stable or 
experiences an increase or decrease in the level of democracy - is not determined by 
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being supplied. As depicted in Table 2.1, if the regime is characterised by a high level 
of democratic rights and institutions, high demand may be expected to stabilise the 
system; while if the supply of democracy is low, high demand should lead to an 
increase in supply. Inglehart's (and others') use of absolute levels of regime 
preferences is thus misguided; it is the levels of demand relative to supply - or net 
demand - that matters. 
Thus, in addition to the two variables I call explicit and implicit demand, I 
develop modified versions I call "net explicit" and "net implicit" demand, which 
measure both kinds of demand in relation to supply; in other words, they measure the 
amount of unmet demand, or excess ("unwanted") supply. Net explicit demand is 
calculated as the demand score minus the supply score. Supply is calculated as the 
reversed FH scores at t converted into a percent measure, where 1 = 0% (no 
democracy) and the ceiling of 7 = 100% (a full democracy). This "percent supply" 
score is then subtracted from the percent average preference for democracy.37 
Since Inglehart & Welzel (2003: 74) and Mishler & Rose (2001: 306) agree 
that cultural values can be used as a measure of indirect support for democracy, I use 
them as a measure of implicit demand for democracy. Net implicit demand involves 
subtracting the supply of democracy scores from self-expression value scores. 
However, self-expression values are not reported as a percent. Being the products of 
factor analysis, they are calculated as z-scores (standardised scores). Thus I also 
convert FH democracy at t scores into z-scores and then subtract the latter from the 
former. 38 
3.3 Sample, Methodology and Hypotheses 
The third World Values Survey includes data for 61 societies; I excluded eight 
because they were not independent political systems (Puerto Rico, Northern Ireland, 
Moscow, the Tambov oblast, and the four Spanish regions). I excluded another seven 
because of missing data in the regime preferences section (Britain, China, Romania, 
37 See Appendix A for data for each country. 
38 This is not an ideal solution, as the calculation method between net explicit and net implicit demand 
is quite different. In particular, the percent method gives an absolute proportion of a known total; while 
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Ghana, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). I combined the separate data for 
Serbia and Montenegro into Yugoslavia and East and West Germany into Germany. 
National measures of regime preferences and self-expression values are calculated 
from weighted WVS data for the remaining 44 countries;39 Freedom House provides 
democracy data for the dependent variable. 
I report the empirical results in the next chapter. The first section provides a 
descriptive overview of the variables and the dataset. In the second section, I perform 
bivariate and multivariate tests of the effects of demand on democracy, engaging with 
Inglehart's work by using absolute measures of demand and levels of democracy. 
Next, I control for reciprocal causation, either by using a control variable or by testing 
the effects of demand on change in the level of democracy. Finally, I move on to test 
the theoretical model, by reporting the effects of net demand on change in supply. 
Research Question 
Do mass regime preferences cause changes in the level of democracy? 
Hypotheses 
HI. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will be at 
least as strong as between implicit demand and change in democracy. 
H2. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will remain 
even after controllingfor the impact of implicit demand. 
H3. The correlations between net demand and change in democracy will be far 
higher than between absolute demand and change in democracy 
H4. There is a strong, positive relationship between the level of net explicit demand 
and subsequent change in the level of democracy. 
If demand supply then the system will be stable. 
If demand> supply then there will be an increase in democracy. 
If demand < supply then there will be a decrease in democracy. 
39 The weight variable "v236" is used in producing aggregate national data to control for 
underrepresented minorities, and the weight variable "v237" is used for pooled individual level 














This chapter consists of three main sections. The first looks at what the data can tell us 
about the state of public values, regime preferences and levels of democracy across 
the 44 countries at time t (1995-1998). I also describe the extent and nature of 
democratic change over the subsequent five years. The second and third sections 
examine the effects of absolute levels of demand and levels of net demand, 
respectively, on change in democracy. 
The second section builds on the methodology ofInglehart (2003) - with some 
changes that have already been discussed - reporting simple bivariate correlations 
between regime preferences, self-expression values and a subsequent level of 
democracy. I then test the effects of both variants of demand with change in 
democracy (by controlling for initial levels of democracy). 
The third section moves on to test the relationship between net demand and 
change in democracy, marking the shift from critically engaging with Inglehart et aI's 
work to testing the theoretical model developed in Chapter two. Initially, continuous 
variables are used in multivariate regression analysis before finally simplifying the 
data into categories for chi-square and ANOVA tests. 
4.1 Description of the Data 
4.1(a) The Representativeness of the Sample 
Freedom House (2004) provides democracy data for 191 independent countries in 
1996 - year <t' for most of my sample. The third World Values Survey covers 61 
societies, but stripping away those that are not independent states or that do not have 
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There are two African countries in the sample, 10 from the Americas, 16 from 
formerly-communist Eastern Europe, six from non-communist Europe, four from 
Central and South Asia, five from East Asia/Pacific and one from the Middle East. 
Using Huntington's (1996) typology of civilisations, there are 13 countries from the 
"Western Christianity" zone, 11 "Orthodox", four "Islamic", two "Confucian", two 
"African", 10 "Latin American", and the "Hindu" and "Japanese" zones are 
represented by their single countries. Thus, the "West", Eastern Europe, Latin 
America and South Asia are well represented in this sample, while East Asia, South 
East Asia, Africa and the Middle East, less so. Nevertheless, the sample includes 
countries from all the regions and cultural "zones" of the world. 
At t, there was one authoritarian state, six pseudo-democracies, 14 electoral 
democracies and 23 liberal democracies - nine of them established and 14 less than a 
decade old. 40 Once again, all types of regime are covered, although the less 
democratic regimes - especially authoritarian ones - are not well represented here. 
There is thus a bias in the sample towards Western, Eastern European and Latin 
American countries that are at least partially democratic. Generalising the results to 
others regions and regimes should be done with caution. 
Generalising from this study is also constrained by the temporal location of the 
data: the late 1990s were a period of democratic success, where the buoyant global 
economy provided a secure environment for the many new "third wave" democracies. 
In addition, the momentum of the third wave continued, spreading democracy further 
afield. 
4.1(b) Description of Key Variables 
4.1 (b)(i) Initial Supply of Democracy, 1995-1998 
The mean country in my sample scored 5 on the reversed Freedom House scale of 1 to 
7. This is on the upper end of the band that Freedom House rates as "partly free", and 
40 The defmitions of these categories, and the categorisation of states (with a few alterations), are 
derived from Diamond (I999: 9- I 5, Appendix I). Pseudo-democracies hold elections, which merely 
serve to "mask (often in part to legitimate) the reality of authoritarian domination" (Diamond, Lipset & 
Linz 1995, cited in Diamond 1999: 15). Electoral democracies are "civilian constitutional system[s] in 
which the legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty 
elections with universal suffrage" (Diamond 1999: 10). Liberal democracies add the criteria of 
horizontal accountability, rule oflaw, cultural and religious freedom, freedom of association and 
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just short of a "free" rating, suggesting that the average country falls short of a liberal 
democracy on just one or two counts. In 1996, by comparison, the mean across all 191 
countries that FH surveyed was 4.4, showing how the sample is slightly more 
democratic than the entire population of states. 
Nigeria had the lowest initial democracy score in the sample, with 1.3 on a 
scale of 1 to 7. Six countries achieved a maximum score of 7: the USA, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Australia. 
4.1 (b)(ii) Change in level of democracy, 1995-98 to 2000-03 
The dependent variable measures the change in democracy over a five-year period 
beginning between 1995 and 1998, depending on when the WVS was conducted in 
the particular country. The mean country saw a small increase in democracy (+0.35), 
while the mean change for the entire population of 191 states between 1996 and 2001 
was lower, at +0.1. There were far more cases of democratisation than of democratic 
decay or reversal across the sample. Six of the countries experienced decreases in 
democracy scores: Russia, Venezuela, Pakistan, Ukraine, Bangladesh, and Belarus 
with the first two dropping by 1.3 points on the seven point FH scale. Bangladesh was 
a marginal change and Pakistan was affected by a military coup that ousted an 
electoral democracy. The other four experienced what Diamond calls the '"hollowing 
out" of democracy by powerful elites, which he identifies as the major challenge to 
democracy in a world where the discourse of democratic rule is virtually hegemonic 
(Diamond 1999: 6). 
Sixteen countries remained at the same level of democracy, with all but two 
(Colombia and Macedonia) already at, or near the top of, the FH scale. Nine of these 
can be called consolidated democracies, having experienced at least two decades of 
liberal democracy at the time of the WVS. The other 22 countries saw an increase in 
democracy: Nigeria and Yugoslavia experienced dramatic democratisations of 3 and 
2.5 points respectively, while the Dominican Republic, Peru, India, Mexico, Taiwan 
and Bosnia Herzegovina underwent moderate increases. 
4. J (b)(iii) Implicit Demand 
The mean self-expression score is, by virtue of being a standardised score, O. The 
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lowest with -1.6. The highest level of supply that is surplus to implicit demand (i.e.: 
the lowest level of net implicit demand) is found in Lithuania, with a score of -2.05. 
In other words, there is far more democracy supplied there than is implicitly 
demanded. Nigeria had the highest level of net (or unmet) implicit demand, 
suggesting that the cultural preconditions for democratic change were in place in 1995. 
Fittingly, in 1998, Nigeria's military dictator, General Sani Abacha, died, making way 
for a democratic government to be installed the next year. 
4. 1 (b)(iv) Explicit Demand 
On average, 73 percent of the public preferred democracy in each country (this is the 
percent average agreement across all four items; using the stricter percent consistent 
agreement method, the mean preference for democracy was only 41 percent - with a 
range from 9% to 78%). India and Russia were the only countries where less than half 
the population (47 percent) preferred democracy, while 93 percent of Germans, on 
average across the four items, did so. Poland had the lowest level of net explicit 
demand: demand for democracy was 29 percentage points lower than supply of 
democracy. Nigeria, once again, had the highest level of net explicit demand: demand 
was 70 percentage points higher than the percent measure of supply of democracy. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std dev. 
Change in democracy from t to t+ 5 
-l.3 3.0 0.35 0.81 (-6 to +6) 
Initial supply of democracy: FH democracy 
l.3 7.0 5.0 l.5 scores at t (1 to 7) 
Implicit demand: self-expression value 
-l.60 2.18 0 scores (relative to a mean of 0) 
Explicit demand: % prefer democracy, 
47 93 73 1l.9 average agreement (0 to 100) 
Net implicit demand: self-expression z-
-2.05 l.88 -0.03 0.90 scores - supply z-scores 
Net explicit demand: % explicit demand -
-29 70 6 23.7 % supply (-100 to +100) 
Source: Data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004) 
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4.2 The Effect of Absolute Levels of Demand on Democracy 
In this section, I attempt to test the findings of Inglehart (2003), Inglehart and Welzel 
(2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) while correcting their 
methodological problems. To facilitate comparison with these earlier studies, I begin 
by using the dependent variable of the absolute level of democracy (Table 4.2), before 
examining change in the level of democracy by controlling for democracy at t (Tables 
4.3 and 4.4). In addition, I use absolute levels of demand - whether explicit demand 
or implicit demand - throughout this section, before testing the effects of net demand 
on change in democracy in section 4.3. 
The first test replicates Inglehart (2003: table 3). It examines the correlations 
between implicit and explicit demand (as well as their constituent items) at t, on one 
hand, and the level of democracy at t+ 5 on the other. This analysis includes what I 
consider to be three improvements to Inglehart and Welzel' s studies: first, there is a 
constant interval of five years between the independent and dependent variables; 
second, the democracy scores are unadulterated FH scores, not "effective democracy"; 
and third, the explicit demand index used here has been calculated so as to offer the 
best reliability and validity. 
The results are similar to those detailed in Inglehart (2003: table 3) although 
the difference between the explanatory power of implicit demand and explicit demand 
is reduced. Inglehart reported that self-expression values account for 35% of the 
variance in the 1995 FH scores, while his democracy/autocracy index only explained 
12%. Table 4.2 shows that the respective figures here are 38% and 22%. Inglehart 
uses a larger sample of 77 states from the third and fourth waves of the WVS, but the 
stronger relationship between explicit demand and democracy in this study is likely to 
also be a function of my improved measure of explicit demand, and my use of 
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Table 4.2: Correlations of Demand and Level of Supply 
Variable 
Self-expression and quality of life is more important 
than economic and physical security 
Subjective happiness 
Participation by signing petitions 
Homosexuality is justifiable 
People can be trusted 
Implicit demand 
A strong undemocratic leader is bad 
Army rule is bad 
A democratic system is good 
Democracy may have problems but it is better than 
the altemativesa 
Explicit demand 
Source: data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004). 
Notes: National-level scores 
N=44 
* significant at 99% level; * = significant at 95% level 
aN 42 
Pearson's correlation with 













Nevertheless, the main problem with the work of Inglehart and colleagues is their 
failure to adequately control for the hypothesis that democracy causes pro-democratic 
values. I argued earlier that using levels of democracy that are measured subsequent 
to demand is not sufficient to show causation: on the whole, levels of democracy 
change very slowly, and democracy at t+ 1 is a very good proxy measure for 
democracy at t-l. The only solution is to use change in the level of democracy as the 
dependent variable, either by calculating the change over a fixed period, or by 
analysing the effects of demand on democracy at t+n while simultaneously 
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While Inglehart and Welzel (2003) and Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 
(2003) use a control for "experience with democracy", this is not used in a broad 
enough range of models to permit comparison; neither is it conceptualised and 
measured in a satisfactory manner. This issue is addressed in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The 
first replicates table 4.2, but reports the partial correlation coefficients, controlling for 
democracy at t. The effect is dramatic: the explanatory "gap" between implicit 
demand and explicit demand vanishes. The former only explains 7% of the variance 
in change in level of democracy over five years compared with the 8% that explicit 
demand accounts for. Both implicit and explicit demand are more weakly associated 
with subsequent levels of democracy once the initial levels are controlled for, but the 
effect on implicit demand is most apparent. Four fifths of its explanatory power 
appears to have been spurious: an effect, rather than cause, of democracy. 
This vindicates my argument that 1) it is likely the relationship between 
supply and demand consists of bidirectional, rather than unidirectional causation, and 
2) implicit demand is more likely to be an "effect" of democratic institutions than 
explicit demand as the latter is the product of individual cognitive evaluations in 
addition to the structural forces of socialisation. 
The multivariate regression models explaining level of democracy (Table 4.4) 
again reveal that, when controlling for the initial level of democracy, the explanatory 
advantage that implicit demand has over explicit demand vanishes. Model 2 uses 
these two variables as regressors and exhibits the pattern seen in table 4.2 and 
reported by Inglehart (2003) and Inglehart & \Velzel (2003): implicit demand has a far 
higher Beta coefficient, and the variance explained in this model is only 2% higher 
than the 38% accounted for by implicit demand in table 4.2. However, once a lagged 
dependent variable is used (Model 5), the explanatory power of implicit versus 
explicit demand becomes indistinguishable, confirmed by Models 3 and 4. 
It would appear that Inglehart has been too quick to dismiss public regime 
preferences as irrelevant for democracy. Once initial supply is controlled for, implicit 
and explicit demand are similarly powerful explanations of the subsequent level of 
democracy. In other words, once we remove the fraction of the variance in self-
expression values that are a product of democracy, implicit demand is no longer a 
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Table 4.3: Controlling for the Initial Supply of Democracy 
Partial 
Variable democracy at t+ 5, controlling 
for democracy at t 
Self-expression and quality of life is more important 
than economic and physical security 
Subjective happiness 
Participation through petition signing 
Homosexuality is justifiable 
People can be trusted 
Implicit demand 
A strong undemocratic leader is bad 
Army rule is bad 
A democratic system is good 
Democracy may have problems but it is better than 
the altemativesa 
Explicit demand 
Source: data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004). 
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression: Explaining Level of Democracy 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 ModelS 
Independent p p p p p 
variables (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
Initial Supply 
0.766 0.710 0.673 0.668 
(0.073) (0.077) (0.089) (0.088) 
of democracy 
0.85 0.79 0.75 0.74 
atr ** ** ** ** 
0.018 0.019 0.013 
Explicit (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) 
Demandb 0.15 0.16 0.11 
+ 
0.724 0.237 0.149 
Implicit (0.208) (0.089) (0.155) 
Demandc 0.53 0.17 0.11 
** + 
1.531 4.117 0.460 2.004 1.074 
Constant (0. 383} (1.303) (0. 685} (0.461) (0.937) 
** ** ** 
RL 0.73 0.40 0.74 0.74 0.75 
Adjusted RL 0.72 0.37 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Source: Data from VlVS (1998) and Freedom House (2004) 
Notes: Dependent variable is FH democracy score at (+ 5 (1-7 scale). 
a FH democracy score at t, 1-7 scale. 
b regime preferences, % 
C self-expression values, z-scores 
** coefficient significant at 99% level, coefficient significant at 90% level. 
N=44 
4.3 The Effects of Net Demand on Democracy 
The effects of absolute measures of demand on change in democracy are negligible: 
Table 4.4 shows that adding explicit and implicit demand to the regression model 
(ModelS) only explains two percent more of the variance in democracy at 1+5 than 
using democracy at 1 alone. Similarly if we calculate the dependent variable as the 
change in democracy from I to 1+5 (Modell of Table 4.5), the variance explained by 
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explains that change in democracy is a function of demand relative to supply, or net 
demand. Nigeria, which experienced the biggest increase in democracy over the time 
period of this study, only has a moderate level of explicit demand (75 percent), and a 
low level of self-expression (-0.58), yet it has the highest levels of net explicit and net 
implicit demand because its initial democracy score is so low (1.3). 
Table 4.5 shows the results when I test the effects of net demand rather than 
the absolute level of demand. The dependent variable here is no longer democracy at 
t+ 5 controlling for democracy at t, it is an overt calculation of change in democracy 
between t and 1+5. Once again, the measures of absolute levels of demand show no 
relationship with change in democracy, while both kinds of net demand show 
moderate and significant correlations (Models 2 and 3). Model 4 of Table 4.5 shows 
that net demand is a much stronger explanation for democratic change than the 
industry-standard measure of absolute levels of demand: together, net implicit and net 
explicit demand account for one quarter of the variance in change in democracy, 
compared with virtually zero for absolute measures. 
Furthermore, the effect of net explicit demand remams significant even 
controlling for net implicit demand, while much of the relationship between net 
implicit demand and change in democracy appears to be accounted for by net explicit 
demand. The extent of a nation's preference for democracy, relative to the supply of 
democracy, is far from "lip service", and appears to be the best measure of demand 
for democratic change. It is a far stronger explanation than an absolute measure of 
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression: Demand versus Net Demand 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables p (s.e.) p (s.e.) p (s.e.) (s.e.) 
Beta Beta Beta 
0.011 
Explicit demand (0.013) 
0.16 
-0.137 
Implicit demand (0.156) 
-0.17 
0.017 0.014 









-0.439 0.256 0.363 0.279 
Constant (0.973) (0.110) (0.113) (0.112) 
* ** * 
R2 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.28 
Adjusted R2 -0.03 0.24 0.15 0.24 
Source: Data from WVS (1998) and Freedom House (2004) 
Notes: Dependent variable: change in democracy (1-7). 
a net explicit demand % regime preferences - % supply of democracy. 
b net implicit demand = self-expression value z-scores - supply of democracy z-scores. 
* significant at 95% level, ** significant at 99% level. 
N 44. 
The relationship between net explicit demand and change in supply is illustrated in 
figure 4.1. A country's shift in levels of democracy over a five-year period is the 
result of factors of structure and agency as well as a little serendipity. Yet the graph 
shows how a single variable, net explicit demand, accounts for 26 percent of the 
variation in change in democracy over 44 countries. The more that public preference 
for democratic rule is not matched in practise in the political system, the bigger the 
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It is unlikely that any other factor is more important in accounting for specific 
changes in levels of democracy across a range of countries. 
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Net explicit demand is regime preferences - supply of democracy at t (-100 to + I 00) 
80 
I have established that there is a positive linear relationship between the level of net 
demand and change in democracy. But the theoretical model in Chapter two generated 
hypotheses based on categories of net demand. In order to test these hypotheses, the 
data on net explicit demand and change in democracy is recoded into categories and 
tested using a cross-tabulation with a Chi-square test and an ANOVA test (tables 4.6 
and 4.7). 
Net explicit demand measures regime preferences in relation to supply, and 
can be separated into three categories: excess supply, where supply is substantially 
higher than demand; equilibrium, where supply and demand are at similar levels; and 
unmet demand, where demand is greater than supply. Table 4.6 compares the effects 
of these three categories on change in democracy, itself divided into three categories: 
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The Chi-square test confirms that the dimensions of change in democracy and 
net explicit demand are not independent, i.e.: they are associated. As one moves to a 
higher net explicit demand category (towards the right-hand side of the table), so there 
tends to be more states showing positive change in democracy. The positive linear 
relationship between these variables is confirmed by the correlation (Kendall's tau-b 
=0.31).41 
The theoretical model predicts that excess supply, described as "mass apathy" 
in Table 2.1, should result in a decrease in democracy as elites use the space provided 
by lack of public support for democracy to consolidate their power. Although the 
small number of cases in this category makes it difficult to generalise, none of these 
countries experience reversals of democracy - contrary to the theoretical model's 
predictions - although neither do any show increases in democracy. 
When net explicit demand is at equilibrium, a large proportion of states remain 
stable, especially in comparison to the unmet demand category. Where demand for 
democracy exceeds supply, 82 percent of countries embark on pro-democratic change 
(compared to only 46 percent of cases where demand and supply are in equilibrium). 
Furthermore, there were no cases of democratisation where demand lags behind 
supply. 
Finally, there is no evidence that there is any necessary or sufficient 
relationship between net demand and change in democracy. In other words, there does 
not appear to be a certain level of net demand that is sufficient for democratisation: 
the "unmet demand" category still has two cases of negative change in democracy. 
Nor is change in democracy necessarily a result of unmet demand: there are 13 cases 
of positive change in democracy in the "equilibrium" category. 
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Table 4.6: Crosstabulation: Net Demand by Change in Democracy 
Net explicit demand categoriesa Total 
excess equili- unmet 




(O%)b 4 (14%) 2 (18%) 6 (14%) 
expecc 0.7 3.8 1.5 
Change in ohser 5 (100%) 1 t (39%) 0 (0%) 16 (36%) 
democracy stable 
categories ex pee 1.8 10.2 4.0 
ohser 0 (0%) I3 (46%) 9 (82%) 22 (50%) 
increase 
expee 2.5 14.0 5.5 
Total 
5 28 11 44 (100%) 
(100%) (100%) (100%) 
Kendall's tau-b Correlation Chi-square Goodness-of-fit test 
-----
Value Significance Value df Significance 
0.31 0.02 15.29 4 0.00 
Source: Data from WVS (1998) and FH (2004). 
Notes: • % explicit demand - % supply, "equilibrium" is greater than -20 and less than 20 
b Percentages of column total 
C The number of observations expected ifthere is no relationship between the variables. 
In Table 4.7, I build on the results of Table 4.6, testing whether the same independent 
variable (categories of net demand) explains change in democracy, as measured with 
the original continuous data. The theoretical model suggested that the effects of net 
demand would be different for each of the categories: unmet demand will produce 
negative change in democracy; zero negative demand will produce no change in 
democracy; and excess supply will produce positive change in democracy. These 
hypotheses are tested by examining the mean change in democracy for each group. 
The ANOVA test shows we can conclude, at the 95 percent confidence level, 
that the difference in the mean change in democracy of the three groups is not due to 
chance. Categorising the countries of the sample according to the level of net demand 
makes a significant difference in the average democratic change in each group. 
Furthennore, the eta correlation (0.38) confinns that there is a linear 
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percent of the variance in the latter accounted for by net demand.42 Similarly, the 
mean of the "unmet demand" category is the largest, followed by the "equilibrium", 
then the "excess supply" categories, as expected. However, the "excess supply" 
category does not, on average, experience a negative change in democracy. Neither is 
the "equilibrium" category the most stable, although it is more stable than the "unmet 
demand" group. 
Table 4.7: ANOVA Test of Net Explicit Demand Categories 
Category Means ANOVA test 
Change in 
Sum of Mean Categories democracf Sig. 
Squares Square 
Mean St.dev. N 
Excess Between 
supply 
0.00 0.00 5 Groups 4.030 2.015 0.04 
Equil i briwnb 
Within 
0.21 0.69 28 Groups 24.385 0.595 
Unmet 
0.86 l.07 11 Total 28.415 
demand 
Whole 
0.35 0.81 44 Eta 0.38 
~amEle 
Source: data from WVS (1998), Freedom House (2004) 
a 
Notes: measured on the 7-point FH scale. 
b defined as net demand> -20 and < 20 
4.4 Summary of Findings 
• Using a validity- and reliability-tested measure of explicit demand as an 
independent variable, a subsequent level of democracy as a dependent variable, 
and a fixed interval between the two, the gap between the explanatory strength of 
implicit demand over explicit demand is diminished. 
• Testing the effects of demand on change in democracy by controlling for an initial 
level of democracy reveals that implicit and explicit demand are of similar 
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strength. Although both have relatively weak relationships with change in 
democracy, we can be reasonably sure that these are causal effects, as controlling 
for initial democracy has removed the reciprocal causation that plagues Inglehart's 
results. 
• Nevertheless, the theoretical model specifies that relative demand is important -
which is why the absolute measures of implicit and explicit demand have such 
weak effects on change in the level of democracy. Testing the effects of net 
implicit and net explicit demand reveals that each has a much stronger relationship 
with democratic change. Once again, the additional benefit of focusing on change 
in democracy is that we can draw conclusion about unidirectional causation. 
• When each variant of net demand is controlled for the other, net explicit demand 
has a much stronger effect on change in democracy. 
• The continuous data for net explicit demand is recoded into categories. These 
categories, "unmet demand", "equilibrium" and "excess supply", have 
significantly different effects on change in democracy. 
• 
• 
Once the continuous data for change in democracy is also recoded into categories, 
the linear, positive relationship between net explicit demand and change is 
reaffirmed with categorical data. 
The specific predictions made, in Chapter two, about the behaviour of each net 
demand category are not borne out, with the notable exception of the "unmet 
demand" group of countries, which have the highest proportion of democratising 
cases. However, there are a very small number of countries that fit the "excess 
supply" and negative change in democracy categories, permitting only tentative 
conclusions from the behaviour of the different eategories. 
• Finally, the cross-tabulation shows that, while there is a linear relationship 
between net demand and change in democracy, unmet demand is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for positive change in democracy. Similarly, 
there is no necessary or sufficient relationship between excess supply and negative 
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4.5 Verifying the Hypotheses 
Hi. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will be at 
least as strong as between implicit demand and change in democracy. 
The evidence from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 support this hypothesis. 
H2. The correlation between explicit demand and change in democracy will remain 
even after controlling for the impact of implicit demand. 
Model 5 of Table 4.4 shows that explicit demand has a weak, but positive 
relationship with change in democracy once the effects of implicit demand is 
controlled for. 
H3. The correlations between net demand and change in democracy will be far 
higher than between absolute demand and change in democracy. 
Table 4.5 provides evidence for this hypothesis, based on the importance of the 
level of demand relative to supply. 
H-I. There is a strong. positive relationship between the level of net explicit demand 
and subsequent change in the level of democracy. 
This general hypothesis is supported with numerous tests: Figure 4.1; Table 4.5; 
the tau-b and eta correlations of Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
If demand = supply then the system will be stable. 
There is not enough evidence to substantiate this hypothesis. While Table 4.7 
shows that this "equilibrium" category is more stable than those with "unmet 
demand", it is not as stable as the "excess supply" category. 
If demand> supply then there will be an increase in democracy. 
This hypothesis is supported by the data in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Most countries 
with "unmet demand" went through positive change in democracy over the 
ensuing five years. 










Does Support/or Democracy Matter? 50 
There is very little evidence to back up this hypothesis because of the small 
number of cases. Furthermore, none of the "excess supply" countries 














Legitimacy is common parlance in the political SCIence literature, and one of its 
variants, "support for democracy", is widely measured in surveys and reported and 
analysed in research papers. However, there have been few empirical test of whether 
support for democracy - or explicit demand - actually matters. This study tested an 
obvious manner in which explicit demand could matter: that it exists as a demand side 
pressure in a political system of masses and elites. In other words, I tested for the 
impact of mass demand for democracy on democratic change. 
I framed my analysis with a theoretical model of the political system - adapted 
from Easton (1965) and Downs (1957) - that operates through a feedback loop 
between mass demand for democracy and elite supply. The model provides a 
mechanism for explaining change in the level of democracy within a political system. 
I argued that what matters for system change is the level of demand in relation to the 
level of supply: "net demand". 
I began by engaging with the only empirical studies that have tested the effects 
of public demand on democracy - Inglehart (2003), Welzel, Ingehart & Klingemann 
(2003) and Inglehart & Welzel (2003) - who argue that deeply-rooted, broad cultural 
orientations called self-expression values are a better measure of support for 
democracy or legitimacy, while overt expressions of regime preference are spurious. I 
replicated their analysis, but used more valid measures of democracy and explicit 
demand and also controlled for the possibility that democracy causes pro-democratic 
values and preferences. The results showed that self-expression values (or implicit 
demand) and regime preferences (or explicit demand) are of similar importance in 
explaining change in the level of democracy, and neither can be dismissed as 
inconsequential. 
I then tested the model of system change, which used the relative level, rather 
than the absolute level, of demand as the independent variable. Using continuous data, 
I found that net demand is a far stronger explanation for democratic change than 
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democracy in relation to the existing supply of democracy is also a far stronger 
predictor of change in democracy than net implicit demand. However, when using 
categorical data, only the group of countries classified as having "unmet demand" 
performed as expected 82 percent experienced positive democratic change. 
By controlling for the initial level of democracy either directly, or indirectly 
by examining the change in the level of democracy - the reciprocal causation between 
values and democracy that muddies Inglehart's analysis is eliminated. We can thus be 
confident that the moderate relationship between net explicit demand and change in 
the supply of democracy reflects a causal relationship. The level of demand (as 
reflected in overtly expressed public preferences for democracy) in relation to the 
existing level of democracy plays an important role in determining how the supply of 
democracy changes over the next few years in a particular country. Furthermore, net 
explicit demand alone explains a quarter of the change in democracy seen in the 
countries of the sample: it is probable that it is the single most important variable in 
accounting for democratic change or stability. 
These results need to be replicated usmg a larger sample that is more 
representative of the different regions and political regimes of the world. In addition, 
the investigation into the effects of explicit demand on the political system could be 
performed more incisively and with a greater ability to draw causal conclusions 
through time series analysis. Among other things, this would allow us to examine the 
impact of a change in demand on change in supply. These objectives can be met as 
more waves of data from socio-political surveys, such as the fourth World Values 
Survey, become available although, a few years interval is needed before measuring 
the subsequent level of democracy. 
The broader implications of this study are fourfold. First, explicit public 
expressions of support for democracy matter, and they matter over and above the 
impact of the broader political culture of a society. This vindicates the widespread 
analysis of regime preferences, and the usage of these types of questions in socio-
political surveys. Second, the literature has focussed on the absolute level of explicit 
demand, when the amount of unmet or net demand is more important for democratic 
change and stability. Third, the concept of a political system, classically formulated 
by Easton and utilised in this paper, has provided a meaningful framework through 
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Finally, Inglehart has shown that self-expression values are strongly correlated 
with level of development, with publics in poorer countries emphasising survival 
values rather than self-expression. Thus, if self-expression values (implicit demand) 
really were the motive force for democratization, many of the newer, less-developed 
third wave democracies would be doomed. However, in contrast to implicit demand, 
explicit demand can be as high in poor countries as in rich, established democracies,43 
because it is a function of individual evaluation of the political system while self-
expression values are engendered through socialisation and remain relatively static at 
the individual level. Thus, the importance of regime preferences for democratic 
change means that poorer societies are not necessarily trapped in a vicious cycle of 
authoritarian rule and economic decay. 
43 Lagos (2003: Table 1) points out that the established democracies of Europe have the highest support 
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Appendix A 
Year of Regime Implicit Explicit Net Exp Supply at Change in 
Country Survey Category" Demandb Demandc Demandd f supply 
(z-score) (%) (%-%) (1-7) (-6 to +6) 
Argentina 1995 LD 0.83 86 II 5.5 .5 
Armenia 1997 PD -Ul 64 22 3.5 .5 
Australia 1995 LD 1.95 86 -14 7.0 .0 
Azerbaijan 1996 PD -1.27 81 60 2.3 .3 
Bangladesh 1996 ED -0.61 84 21 4.8 -.3 
Belarus 1996 PD -1.50 61 40 2.3 -.3 
Bosnia 1998 ED -0.35 72 39 3.0 LO 
Brazil 1997 ED 0.31 63 0 4.8 .3 
Bulgaria 1997 LD -1.04 57 -18 5.5 .8 
Chile 1996 LD 0.12 70 -14 6.0 .0 
Colombia 1997/8 ED 0.44 66 16 4.0 .0 
Croatia 1995 ED -0.17 84 34 4.0 .8 
Dom. Rep. 1996 ED 0.48 81 19 4.8 1.8 
Estonia 1996 LD -L08 77 -11 6.3 .3 
Finland 1996 LD L13 74 -26 7.0 .0 
Georgia 1996 ED -1.18 70 24 3.8 .3 
Germany 1997 LD 1.51 93 1 6.5 .0 
India 1995 ED -0.32 47 -3 4.0 1.5 
Japan 1995 LD 0.78 88 0 6.3 .3 
Latvia 1996 LD -0.54 73 -10 6.0 .5 
Lithuania 1996 LD -1.10 65 -27 6.5 .0 
Macedonia 1997 ED -0.81 60 2 4.5 .0 
Mexico 1995/6 PD 0.68 61 7 4.3 1.3 
Moldova 1996 ED -1.58 66 12 4.3 .8 
Nigeria 1995 AR -0.58 75 70 1.3 3.0 
Norway 1996 LD 1.63 92 -8 7.0 .0 
Pakistan 1997 ED -0.29 56 15 3.5 -.8 
Peru 1996 PD 0.06 71 21 4.0 1.5 
Philippines 1996 LD 0.03 59 -II 5.3 .3 
Poland 1997 LD -0.08 63 -29 6.5 .0 
Russia 1995 ED -1.60 47 -II 4.5 -1.3 
Slovenia 1995 LD 0.06 86 -8 6.5 .0 
South Africa 1996 LD -0.26 68 -24 6.5 .0 
South Korea 1996 LD -0.18 84 6.0 .0 
Spain 1995 LD 0.61 79 -13 6.5 .0 
Sweden 1996 LD 2.18 87 -13 7.0 .0 
Switzerland 1996 LD 1.61 78 -22 7.0 .0 
Taiwan 1994/5 LD -0.60 80 13 5.0 1.0 
Turkey 1997 ED 0.33 73 31 3.5 .3 
Ukraine 1996 ED -1.53 51 -7 4.5 -.5 
Uruguay 1996 LD 0.58 83 -5 6.3 .8 
USA 1995 LD 1.66 88 -12 7.0 .0 
Venezuela 1996 LD 0.39 79 9 5.3 -1.3 
Yugoslavia 1996 PD -0.85 74 57 2.0 2.5 
Mean I -0.03 73 6 5.1 0.35 
Notes: a "LD~ is liberal democracy, "ED" is electoral demoeraey, "PD" is pseudo-democracy, "AR~ is authoritarian 
regime. b Self-expression values. C Regime preferences, % average agreement. d % prefer democracy _ % supply. e 












The Freedom House Democracy Checklist 
Political Rights Checklist 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest 
tabulation ofballots? 
4. Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power? 
57 
5. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive 
political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these 
competing parties or groupings? 
6. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility 
for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 
7. Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 
8. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self 
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in 
the decision-making process? 
Additional discretionary Political Rights questions: 
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system 
provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the 
right to petition the ruler? 
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a 
country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another 
group? 
The Civil Liberties Checklist 
Freedom of Expression and Belief 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in 
cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the Survey 
gives the system credit.) 
2. Are there free religious institutions and is there free private and public religious 
expression? 
Association and Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political 
parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.) 
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective 
collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations? 
Rule of Law and Human Rights 
I. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated 
equally under the law? Are police under direct civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, 
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insurgencies? (Note: freedom from war and insurgencies enhances the liberties in a free 
society, but the absence of wars and insurgencies does not in and of itself make a not free 
society free.) 
4. Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption? 
Personal Autonomy and Economic Rights 
1. Is there open and free private discussion? 
2. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice 
of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the 
state? 
3. Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is 
private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or 
organized crime? 
4. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, 
and size of family? 
5. Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on 
landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of 
legitimate economic gains? 
Source: Freedom House (2002) 
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